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Leibniz and Ramanuja on the One and the 
Many 
Tinu Ruparell 
University of Calgary 
THE polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1646-1716 CE) and the Visistadvaita 
theologian Ramanuja (c. 1017-1137 CE ) 
both face a similar conceptual problem: 
each holds that the universe is composed of 
a single substance yet is experienced by us 
in the phenomenal realm as plural. The 
problem, simply put, is that they must both 
show how it is that our experience of 
diversity arises from ontological unity -
how the many comes from the one. In what 
follows I suggest that reading Leibniz 
through Ramanuja in the way suggested by 
the structure of metaphorical dialectic as 
elucidated by Ricoeur and exploited by 
Clooneyl (among others) casts Leibniz's 
problem in a more helpful light. As I show 
below, such a reading facilitates for Leibniz 
Ramanuja's dialectic or 'polarity' 
theological method In order to nuance 
Leibniz's discussion of well-founded 
phenomena. This provides a better 
understanding of the relationship between 
fundamental or primary monadic substances 
such as God and non-primary monadic 
created reality. Firstly, however, we must 
rehearse a little of Leibniz's Monadology in 
order to indicate where Ramanuja's method 
might usefully be employed. 
Leibniz begins his Monadology 
with a very simple and brief argument: 
1. The Monad, which we shall discuss 
here, IS nothing but a simple 
substance that enters into 
composites - simple, that is, without 
parts. 
2. And there must be simple 
substances since there are 
-composites; for the composite is 
nothing more than a collection, or 
aggregate, of simples. 
3. But where there are no parts, neither 
extension, nor shape, nor divisibility 
is possible. These monads are the 
true atoms of nature and, in brief, 
the elements of things. 
4. There is no dissolution to fear, and 
there is no conceivable way in 
which a simple substance can perish 
naturally. 
S.For the same reason there is no 
conceivable way a simple substance 
can begin naturally, since it cannot 
be formed by composition. 
6. Thus one can say that monads can 
only _ begin by creation and end by 
annihilation, whereas composites 
begin or end through their parts. 
7. There is also no way of explaining 
how a monad can be altered or 
changed internally by some other 
creature, since one cannot transpose 
anything in it, nor can one conceive 
-of any internal motion that can be 
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excited, directed, augmented or 
diminished within it, as can be done 
in composites, where there can be 
change among the parts. The 
monads have no windows through 
which something can enter or leave. 
Accidents cannot be detached, nor 
can they go about outside of 
substances, as the sensible species 
of the Scholastics once did. Thus, 
neither substance nor accident can 
enter a monad from without. 
8. However monads have some 
qualities otherwise they would not 
even be beings. And if simple 
substances did not differ at all in 
their qualities, there would be no 
way of perceiving any change from 
its simple ingredients; and if the 
monads had no qualities, they would 
be indiscernible from one another, 
since they also do not differ in 
quantity. As a result, assuming a 
plenum, in motion, each place 
would always receive only the 
equivalent of what it already had, 
and one state of things would be 
indistinguishable from another. 
9. It is also necessary that each monad 
be different from each other. For 
there are never two beings in nature 
that are perfectly alike, two beings 
in which it is not possible to 
discover an internal difference, that 
is . one founded on intrinsic 
denomination. 
10. I also take it for granted that every 
created being, and consequently 
every created monad as well, is 
subject to change, and even that this 
change is continual in each being. 2 
We can see that his argument follows 
deductively. Premises I and 2 are merely 
definitions, 2 being a corollary of 1. Simple 
substances, which Leibniz calls monads, are 
defined as entities without parts, and 
composite entities are those made up of 
parts. As two sides of a coin the two are 
both mutually exclusive and dependent. So 
far so good; I expect that most people would 
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agree with Leibniz's fairly innocuous 
premises. Premise 3 is the most important 
for our purposes. If a thing has no parts, 
then it follows that it has no front side, or 
part, nor a backside, left or right. If it has no 
sides or parts then it cannot be extended in 
space, and if it is not extended in space, then 
I 
. it is not material in the ordinary (Cartesian) 
way.3 Monads are also, Leibniz goes on, 
indivisible, since if they were divisible they 
could in principl~ be divided into left and 
right, or greater and lesser parts. But being 
defined as simple substances they cannot 
have parts and thus they cannot be divisible. 
These three premises are actually 
quite radical and certainly ahead of 
Leibniz's time for they foreshadow both 
modern atomic theory as well as aspects of 
quantum theory. They are also in many 
ways the foundations of Leibniz's mature 
thought. Indeed the importance of the idea 
of the monad can hardly be underplayed in 
the full flowermg of Leibniz's metaphysics; 
however the full implications of this notion 
were hardly felt in his time. The monad is a 
perplexing creature and we shall see just 
how queer it is below. Three further 
, premises need comment at this stage. 
Premises 4-6 are also corollaries of 
the basic notion of a simple substance. 
Leibniz argues that a monad cannot perish 
naturally since natural construction and 
destruction are in fact simply the breaking 
down or building up of composites. When 
we naturally destroy a brick, we get dust -
the brick is a composite, and, in crushing it 
we have simply made it a large pile of 
smaller composites. We could go on 
crushing this dust ad infinitum, and while 
eventually it may look like we have 
destroyed the brick entirely, the law of 
conservation of matter tells us that the atoms 
of the brick are not destroyed but rather 
transformed into invisible atoms or perhaps 
into different kinds of atoms. The basic 
units cannot be destroyed and for the same 
reason caruiot be created either: for Leibniz 
they come into being and are annihilated 
solely at God's behest. So we arrive at the 
notion that a monad is a simple, immaterial 
substance able to aggregate into composites 
.1 
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and which can neither be destroyed nor 
created naturally. 
Now most of what Leibniz has just 
stated should be familiar enough to modem 
scientific realists. Leibniz's premises make 
sense in our experience of the world. We 
now accept that we do not destroy matter 
nor create it so much as simply push it 
about or pull it apart. Secondly the 
definition of a simple substance seems non-
controversial: simples cannot have parts and 
complexes are made of simples. But the 
consequences of ~hese few premises are 
. staggering. That the world is made of 
complexes seems patently true; however 
Leibniz has argued that the simples making 
up these complexes must be immaterial. To 
, put it another way: if the primary substance 
of creation is immaterial then the world of 
complexes, the world we experience in 
normal sensory life, must be very different 
than it appears. 
The counter-intuitiveness of this 
position is difficult to exaggerate. Indeed' 
the claim that the world is at its foundations 
immaterial was one of the reasons why 
Leibniz's mature metaphysics have not only. 
been disputed but also derided. How is it 
that the patently hard substance making up 
all material things in the universe could be 
composed ultimately of incorporeal 
substance?4 How do conglomerations of 
Leibniz's immaterial entities add up to the 
very real impenetrability experienced when I 
stub my toe, on the leg of the table on which 
I now write? To dispute the materiality of 
the cosmos might seem counter-intuitive at 
best, but Leibniz's premises are difficult to 
reject out of hand. As mentioned above, 
they do follow deductively, and the 
foundational premises - those that count -
seem to be analytically true. I find it 
difficult not to be convinced by Leibniz's 
basic arguments, but as we shall see later, 
Leibniz does face some significant 
problems.5 
Now before we consider monads 
further, let us first follow our train of 
thought through so that we are sure just what 
is at stake if Leibniz is right. If the basic 
substance of the universe is immaterial, then 
" 
our experience of the world of matter is 
either in significant ways false or deluded 
and hence we must revise our view of the 
physical world. Leibniz inherited Descartes' 
legacy of the problem of interactionism: 
how it is that res (cogitans (thinking stuff, 
mind) relates and i'nteracts with res extensa 
(extended stuff, bodies)? This was a serious 
difficulty for Descartes who never 
developed a convincing' explanation for 
everyday occurrences such as human 
locomotion. Spinoza and Leibniz provided 
two coherent responses to the problem of 
interaction, Leibniz's being to deny that 
corporeal matter existed, or rather he 
asserted that matter was in fact monadic in 
composition. For Leibniz, all that exists is 
mind D or rather soul-like entities some of 
which exhibit properties of mind6 D which 
merely appear to be substantial in the way 
that we regularly experience the physical 
world. Clearly. for Leibniz, the universe is 
not in itself the way we normally experience 
it. It is very different from what our senses 
tell us it is, though of course at the level of 
ordinary perception the world does work in 
regular harmonious ways. That the universe 
functions harmoniously and predictably was 
important to affirm in the early modem 
period as the then nascent science was 
quickly coming fo dominate the intellectual 
tradition of western Europe. Importantly, 
the world as describable through science 
was for Leibniz entirely compatible with 
monads. We should not therefore think that 
the world is some kind of illusion.7 Leibniz 
emphatically maintains that the world is 
real, but monadic, that is immaterial. 
, Now (let us very quickly take this 
train of thought to its ultimate end. If the 
universe is immaterial and this means that it 
, is composed of what Leibniz terms 'soul-
like entities' (some of which have the 
properties of minds) then how is it that what 
we see around us has effects on other 
things? If a train is a composition of 
monads, or soul-like entities, how is it that 
so much death and' destruction ensues when 
it goes off the rails or collides with another 
train, or should we say, another collection of 
soul-like entities? Leibniz's answer is that 
3
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monads as immaterial atomic entities 
perceive or cognize each other. 8 
Furthermore there is a natural tendency 
within monads for perceptions to change, to 
be in process and drive forward as a measure 
and element of time - this Leibniz calls a 
monad's appetition or desire. So Leibniz 
suggests that a monad is related to other 
monads through thinking them, and being 
thought by them in a continuing process. 
And because in principle anyone monad, 
whether singly or in concert, can come into 
contact with any other monad, each monad 
is related to all others - each monad 
perceives and is perceived by all other 
monads.9 
How is it that monads are able to do 
this? Leibniz holds that they were created to 
do so by God who organises all of these 
relations in the most harmonious way. Each 
monad is related in a particular way to all 
other monads in a system of pre-established 
harmony. The principle of pre-established 
harmony, for which Leibniz was equally 
celebrated and ridiculed,IO follows from 
Leibniz's view of God's omnipotence, 
omniscience and absolute goodness. Being 
omniscient, God knows the ideal state of the 
universe, being omnipotent God can create 
this state and being absolutely good, God is 
duty bound to actually create it. The world 
as we have it is, for Leibniz, the best of all 
possible worlds since it actualises the most 
harmony between all of its related monads. 
We should note here also that God is seen 
by Leibniz to be a monad as well, though a 
monad distinguished from all others by 
having all perfections and being, uniquely, a 
necessary monad. 11 
Now that we have a clearer view of 
just the kind of world Leibniz is letting us 
into, we can return to the notion of monads 
and their nature. In §7-8 of the 
Monadology, Leibniz states that for things to 
have different qualities, yet all be composed 
of immaterial monads, monads must each 
have the possibility of multitudinous 
simultaneous modifications. Monads must 
bear some qualities, for if they were not 
distinguishable in this way, it would be 
possible for two different monads to be 
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identical - clearly logically impossible. 
Leibniz draws an even stronger conclusion 
however in that not only are all monads in 
principle distinguishable, they must all be 
individually unique - each monad must be 
different from every other monad .. ". 
In § 10 Leibniz further states as an 
axiom that 'every created being, and 
consequently the created monad as well, is 
subject to change and even that this change 
is continual in each thing.' Weare now 
getting closer to a complete picture of 
monads. Monads are fundamental principles 
of action whose state at any time is defined 
by a multitude of cognitions, that is relations 
to other monads, and subject to constant 
change reflecting their continuing alteration 
with respect to other monads. The relation of 
monads forms a dynamic network where 
each node (each monad) continually alters 
and 1~ altered by the other continuously 
changing nodes in real time. 
At this point let me summarize what 
we know about monads: firstly they are 
simple, eternal and immaterial. Secondly 
they form together in composites to make up 
what we experience as the world around us. 
However as immaterial entities, they cannot 
be related in a Newtonian sense, but rather 
are interrelated through perception and 
appetition: they think and are thought by 
other monads. Thirdly they are individual 
and particular - each monad being unique 
by virtue· of its particular intrinsic relations 
to all others. Now the main problem that 
arises for Leibniz is how to explain the 
'hardness' of the exp~rienced world. 12 
How is it that we seem to experience 
objective material reality when in fact all 
that there actually is in the universe are 
immaterial entities and the subjective 
relations between them? Leibniz seems to 
have two stories to tell at this stage. The 
first makes bodies the appearances of 
collections of monads. This is the 
phenomenalist interpretation where bodies 
do not themselves have independent realities 
but are the appearances of collected monads. 
Just as a flock of sheep is only a flock in the 
mind of the perceiver, bodies do not have 
independent realities apart from their 
4
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appearances. Bodies are what collections of 
monads look like to other collections of 
monads. This interpretation makes Leibniz 
rather close to Berkeley's esse est percipi 
where bodies rely for their existence on their 
being perceived. 
The other, and some argue 
incompatible, interpretation is the 
aggregationist view. . Here bodies are well 
founded (benefundatum) phenomena, to use 
Leibniz's phrase. Bodies are real (though 
dependent) aggregates of real substantial 
unities. On this view what you get when 
you analyse bodies 'all the way down' as it 
were, are nothing but simple, immaterial 
unities, which are, of course, monads. Ifthis 
is the case, moving back to the level of our 
normal experience must yield bodies which 
are merely the aggregates of monads. These 
monadic aggregates perceive themselves as 
an, "embodied creature that stands in spatio-
temporal and causal relations to every other 
body in the universe, and hence to every 
other body that is represented by another 
monad as its body.,,13 
While sometimes complicated to 
distinguish, these two interpretations are, I 
suggest, pulling in opposite directions. The 
phenomenalist sees the material bodies 
which make up our normal experience as 
unreal but understandable appearances of 
immaterial monads. The aggregationist 
demurs maintaining that material bodies are 
well founded phenomena - the real 
aggregates of real substantial unities. 
Now there is a great deal of debate 
in Leibniz studies on this problem but I 
cannot here run through the . various 
arguments on both sides. Suffice it to say 
that the situation seems to be at a stalemate, 
the various responses dependent on what 
one sees to be at stake in the question: the 
sensibility of I"eibniz's metaphysical system 
or the corporeal reality of the physical 
world. It is here where I think we can profit 
by bringing Ramanuja into the fray. 
Of the large corpus of Ramanuja's 
thought I will focus only on those- aspects 
which I will put to use for Leibniz. We 
should note, -however, that prima facie 
Visistadvaita shares some significant 
concepts with Leibnizian idealism: indeed 
reading the first part of the Monadology 
through Visistadvaitan eyes is revealing. In 
the fIrst sections of the Monadology one 
could read atman (or jivatman as the 
particularised form of. atman associated with 
prakritic bodies) for monad. In this sense 
the jivatman is simple, immaterial, and 
eternal. It is also, as related to Bralupan (as 
maha atman), the fundamental element of 
the universe -with the prakritic or material 
elements with which it is associated being 
merely the primeval evolutes-' of original 
purusha (Brahman). Each jivatman is also 
unique, differing from each other in 
precisely the same way that monads differ: 
they have varying degrees of perfection 
partially due to their specific co-relation to 
all other jivatmans and to Brahman. Where 
the monad and jivatman differ is in the fact 
that the jivatman does not aggregate into 
composites to form phenomenal bodies. 
The relationship of individual souls 
(jivatmans) to each other and to their creator 
(Brahman) is the subject of Ramanuja's 
principle doctrine of the world as God's 
body, and it is to this that we now turn. 
Ramanuja construes the God-world 
relationship along the general analogy that 
God is to the universe as our souls are to our 
bodies:14 To develop this Ramanuja uses the 
primary relationship of mode (prakara) and 
mode-possessor (prakarin) to describe how 
it is that a body is related to the self or 
atman. This relation is further subdivided 
into three sub or correlative relationships: 
(1) the support (adhara) J thing-supported 
(adlieya) relationship; (2) the controller 
(niyantr) / thing-controlled (niyama) 
relationship; and (3) the principal (sesinJ-l/ 
accessory (sesa) relationship. I do not have 
space to consider each of these relations 
separately, but a consideration of the prakara 
/ prakarin paradigm will do for our purposes. 
Put very simply, the mode (prakara) 
is that which is made manifest and the 
mode-possessor (prakarin) is that which 
manifests the mode. In Leibnizian terms, 
the mode-possessor is the monad and the 
mode its perceptions. Ramanuja explains it 
thus: 
5
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This is the relation between the self 
(atman) and its body (in the sense 
we are considering): the relation 
between support and thing-
supported such that the latter is 
incapable of being realised apart 
from the former, that between 
controller and thing-controlled, and 
that between principal and 
accessory. The atman [ . . .] is that 
which in every respect is the 
support, controller and principal of 
what is the thing -supported, 
controlled and the accessory, viz. 
the 'body' or form which exists as a 
mode (of the mode-possessor, i.e. 
atman), incapable of being realised 
apart (from the latter). Now this is 
the relationship between the (finite) 
individual self and its own 
(material) body. 15 
Lipner points out that there are both 
ontological and epistemological implications 
of the mode/mode-possessor relationship.16 
The ontological aspect is brought out in the 
quotation above by the phrase 'incapable of 
being realised apart from the [mode 
possessor].' This is a dependence of being 
such that the mode cannot exist without the 
absolute support of the mode-possessor. 
Moreover, this is true regardless of whether" 
the mode is material or not. Carman notes, 
in this regard, that Ramanuja privileges the 
body-self relationship as more fundamental 
than the mode-mode possessor 
relationship. I? The latter is a general 
relationship, and it is clear, for Ramanuja 
that general characteristics depend for their 
existence on their being possessed by some 
substance. So, for example, 'heaviness" (a 
mode) is a general characteristic which 
requires for its existence the existence of 
something else (its mode-possessor). 
'Heaviness' cannot exist on its own -
unpossessed by some substance. But this 
general characteristic is secondary to the 
particular 'body-self relationship. The 
body is, for Ramanuja, paradigmatieally the 
mode of the self or atman (the mode-
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possessor). Carman explains this view thus: 
"to say that something is a mode is just a 
. brief way of stating its relationship of utter 
dependence, but to state that something is a 
body is to state an irreducible and 
fundamental fact. Therefore it is this 
category which is fundamental. If a material 
thing is the body of some intelligent self, 
then it is a mode.,,18 This is an important 
point since it allows that bodies, that is, a 
kind of material substance (dravya), can be 
modes of selves (atman) - which are also 
substances, and that, by analogy, creatures 
such as humans can thus be modes of the 
supreme self, Brahman. 19 If we accept 
Ramanuja's argument here, we can 
immediately lay to rest the question of how 
atmans, which are substances, can be modes 
of another substance, Brahman. 
This is also rather important for our 
comparative exercise since if we appropriate 
Ramanuja's notion of the world as God's 
body for Leibniz, then the mode/mode 
possessor relationship entails that not only 
are physical/phenomenal bodies modes or 
forms of their monadic selves, but each 
created monad (which are substantial 
unities) can be seen as bodies of the ultimate 
monad which is God. This is a significant 
re-narration of Leibniz who assumes the 
Christian ultimate separation of God and 
creation D even though by his own lights 
both creation and God are monadic in 
nature. Leibniz's view of God, which I only 
touched on earlier, is that God is the perfect, 
uniquely self-created monad. As such God 
differs from all other mon~ds not in kind but 
in degree only. Ramanuja's view of the 
world as God's body is ironically more 
consistent with God as a monad than 
Leibniz's capitulation to the conventional 
Christian standpoint, since on Ramanuja's 
view there is no substantial distinction 
between creation and the divine. 
Lipner's epistemological aspect of 
the mode/mode-possessor relationship 
shows that the mode does not 'make sense' 
without reference to the mode-possessor, 
that is, the mode lacks a raison d'etre. 
Lipner alludes to Ramanuja's example of 
staffs and earrings to illustrate. A staff or an 
6
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earring, though they each have their own 
individual, substantive existence apart from 
anything else, cannot have their purpose 
fulfilled or realised in seclusion. They 
require a staff-bearer or earring-wearer to 
fully be what they are. A certain thing can 
thus only be known as itself within its 
rightful mode/mode-possessor relationship. 
Leibniz's echo of this is found in the 
notion of pre-established harmony. Each 
monad can only be what it is by virtue of its 
correlation to all other monads - that is in its 
proper relation. No individual monad can be 
what it is much less achieve its perfection in 
isolation. And again, Ramanuja's body of 
God doctrine helps to make sense of this 
since this harmony is justified not by' the 
will of God (as in Leibniz) but in the 
necessity of God's own body. The harmony 
of the universe is transformed from a 
particular and somewhat implausible 
proposition about a world apart from God 
into the perfection found within God itself. 
It reflects a more perfect necessity. ' 
So on Ramanuja's view, the world 
is God's 'body' in that the universe is the 
manifestation of the effected Brahman, 
completely dependent for its very being and 
meaning on the Absolute One, existing 
(ideally) only in order to serve and glorify 
its Lord. In this, respect Brahman is both the 
efficient and material cause of the universe-
its creator - as well as the resultant effect, 
the universe itself. Ramanuja explains this 
as the dual nature of Brahman's existence: 
as Brahman in his causal condition (brahma 
karanavastham) and Brahman in his effected 
condition (brahma karyavastham).2o In 
Leibnizian terms the material universe 
becomes the body of God - with God being 
the universe's perfect and primary monad. 
As its body, the universe shares its monadic 
nature with God but just as our own bodies 
do not exhaust our selves, God as the 
monadic maha atman is not exhausted by the 
universe, and certainly not as we experience 
it. Moreover the doctrine of pre-established 
harmony is set in a more elegant context 
when seen not as the fortunate result of a 
created universe but rather as the inner 
harmony of a perfect GOd?l 
Having heard Ramanuja, we can 
now return to our Leibnizian problem of 
giving an account of the 'hardness' of the 
world - that is an understanding of the 
physical world. Either corporeal bodies are 
mere appearances, that is the way collected 
monads look to each other; or they are the 
dependently real result of an aggregation of 
monads. Ramanuja faced a similar problem 
in trying to understand the identity-in-
difference which obtains between individual 
jivatmans and the divine Brahman and he 
solves it through the particular method of his 
theology. Lipner calls this method 'polarity 
theology' aria we can understand it' by 
considering again the term Visistadvaita. 
Visistadvaita, as Lipner has it, is 
reflected in two complementary discourses, 
corresponding to two mahavakyas (great 
sayings) of the Upanishads. As Ramanuja 
needed to remain within the theologically 
important 'literal' interpretation of the 
scriptures, he needed to affirm both the ' 
rriayhavakyas of the Taittiriya Upanishad 
(Brahman is saccidananda reality, 
knowledge, infinite) and oftheChandogya 
Upanishad (tat tvam asi - That thou art).22 
In order to do so he spoke of the God-world 
relationship in two ways:' from top down, 
that is, from the perspective of Brahman, 
and from the bottom up, that is, from our 
creaturely vantage point.23 From, top down 
the world is not distinct from Brahman; 
everything deriving from, gaining sense with 
respect to, and maintained by the Absolute 
One without a second. Here there is no 
difference between Brah1I).an and the world, 
the universe being nothing but Brahman in 
'effected' or manifest state. This collapsing 
of difference Lipner calls the centripetal 
tendency of Ramanuja's theology. From the 
point of view of creatures, however, there is 
great distinction since Brahman is perfect in 
all qualities, infinite and necessary, 24 and 
thus, of course, very different from creation. 
Lipner refers to this separating movement as 
the centrifugal tendency. The picture of 
Brahman e'merging 'from Ramanuja is that of 
Brahman encompassing a dialectic tension 
between the centripetal and centrifugal, 
between the One and the many. This view 
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makes creation both quasi-autonomous yet 
inseparable from its source, sustenance and 
end. It makes Brahman and creation 
identical or non-dual but, in the dialectic of 
centrifugal and centripetal - a dialectic 
which mirrors that of comparative 
conversations such as this -also particular. 
This is what is meant by identity-in-
difference or 'qualified non-dualism.' 
Now Ramanuja:s polarity theology, 
through which the notion of Visistadvaita is 
communicated, can also be applied to 
Leibniz. In what might be called a typical 
Vedantic style Leibniz's solution is found 
not in the either/or of phenomenalism or 
aggregationism, but in the both-and ,of 
Visistadvaita. Understood from the bottom 
up, monads combine to form dependently 
real aggregates, while from the top down 
phenomenal material nature is understood'to 
be founded in and derived from monadic 
reality. We have in this tense dialectic not 
only squared Leibniz's circle but in the 
process given more coherence to his view 
that God is a monad as well as greater 
substance to the doctrine of pre-established 
harmony. 
Of course this kind of consolation of 
Leibniz's metaphysics was .not available to 
Leibniz himself for various historical and, 
more importantly, theological reasons. One 
might object that on these grounds such a 
reading of Leibniz is illegitimate. Clearly I 
must disagree with such a complaint, though 
I cannot moul}t a defence here. Rather I 
submit the discussion now concluded as an 
experiment in comparative philosophy of 
religion and leave my readers the task of its 
evaluation and, hopefully, continuation. 
Notes 
1 See Francis Clooney's Seeing Through Te;ts: 
Doing Theology among the Srivaisnavas of 
South India, (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY press, 1996) 
for an extended example of this dialectical 
hermeneutic method at work. 
2 G.W. Leibniz, 'The Monadology,' in G.W 
Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics and Other 
Essays, trans. Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew, 
(Indianapolis: Hacket Press, 1991), p.68. 
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3 I will here accept Descartes' and Aristotle's 
view of extension as a necessary (though perhaps 
not sufficient) characteristic of prime matter, and 
I also take it that both Descartes and Leibniz 
meant extension to include the idea of 
impenetrability. I do not here have space to 
consider the idea that primary matter is not to be 
understood as extension. Leibniz himself argued 
against this view in an earlier stage of his 
thinking only to accept it later on. [See Daniel 
Garber and Jean Baptiste Rauzy, "Leibniz on 
Body, Matter and Extension," Supplement to the 
Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, July 
2004, (18) voL 78, no. 1, pp. 23-40]. Garber and 
Rauzy argue that in the period between 1680-90 
Leibniz tried to reduce material bodies to force 
rather than to extension - the latter of which is 
found in Leibniz's mature view as seen in the 
Monadology. 
4 We should not suppose that Leibniz himself 
suggested that dividing up complexes, that is 
material entities, ad infinitum will eventually 
produce non-material entities. While he 
maintains that primary substance is immaterial, 
in correspondence to Samuel Clarke in 1715 he 
upholds that infinite division cannot be carried 
out to this end. But this view is now not 
altogether obvious. While it is significantly 
beyond the scope of this paper, according to the 
standard interpretation of quantum wave-particle 
duality, the analysis of the smallest elements 
making up the smallest sub-atomic particles' 
leaves the corporeality of such entities 
indeterminate. 
5 For instance, the notion of a primary simple 
substance may be questioned by suggesting that 
composites may well be primary. There seems 
to be no necessary reason that complexes must 
be able to be broken down into simples. The 
world may well be composed of un analysable, 
. complex entities. Just such a particularist 
position was the dominant view of the 
Aristotelians. . 
6 Monadology § 63-63. 
7 I agree with Rutherford's interpretation that 
the world, while being an appearance of 
aggregated monads, is still a well-founded 
phenomenon - that is it is founded on real 
entities. Leibniz goes to some pains to maintain 
that the universe is indeed real but immaterial, 
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and yet appears to us to be materiaL See Donald 
Rutherford in The Cambridge Companion to 
Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley, (Cambridge: CUP, 
1995), p. 147. 
8 Since monads have no sensory organs their 
perceptions cannot be sense-based but rather 
closer to what one does when one holds 
something before the mind. In this sense it is an 
'internal perception.' 
9 Monadology §56. This is referred to as the 
Mirror hypothesis. Each monad is a mirror to all 
others. 
10 The notion of pre-established harmony 
leading to the best of all possible worlds 
prompted Voltaire towrite in Candide of the 
views of Professor Pang10ss, a character surely 
to have been modelled on Leibniz, that if this is 
the best of all possible worlds, what must the rest 
be like? 
11 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider 
Leibniz's interesting variations on the 
Ontological argument. See Graham Oppy's 
Ontological Arguments and Belief in God 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1996) for a good discussion 
of these. 
12 This·prob1em is in a sense the opposite of the 
current 'hard problem' in philosophy of mind, 
that is how does mind arise from matter. 
Leibniz's problem is the opposite - how does 
matter arise from ideas? 
13 Donald Rutherford, "Metaphysics: the Late 
period", in The Cambridge Companion to 
Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley, (Cambridge: CUP, 
.. 1995), p. 137. . 
14 This fundamental relationship is called in the 
Srivaisnava tradition the sarira-saririn-bhava. 
[John B. Carman, The Theology of Ramamlja: 
An Essay in Interreligious Understanding, (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1974), p. 125, (hereafter referred to as TR)] In 
what follows I rely mainly on the account given 
by Julius Lipner both in his, "The World as 
God's Body: In Pursuit of Dialogue with 
Ramanuja," Religious Studies, 20 (1984):145-61, 
(hereafter referred to as WGB) and the more 
thorough treatment found in his monograph The 
Face of Truth, (London: Macmillan, 1986). 
Where they add or differ significantly to Lipner's 
views, I will use the accounts given by John B. 
Carman, (noted above), and Eric Lott in his God 
and the Universe in the Vedantic Theology of 
Ramanuja[QMadras: Ramanuja Research Society, 
1976) hereafter referred to as Gu. My own 
analysis of Ramanuja' s standpoint will be made 
clear. 
15 Ramanuja Vedarthasamgraha, as translated 
by Lipner, WGB, pp. 148-9. 
16 WGB, pp. 150-1. 
17 TR,pp.126-7. 
18 TR, p. 127. 
19 Ibid. 
20 WGB, p. 38. Carman notes that Ramanuja 
accepts as axiomatic the Samkhya view that the 
effect is a transformation of the ca1,lse 
(satkaryavada) and the doctrine of Brahman 
changing from causal to effected conditions 
should be seen in this context. TR, p. 134. See 
also Gu, p. ISO 
21 Leibiliz himself uses the analogy of the 
harmony of the internal workings of the body in 
order to explain the harmonious subservience of 
monadic creation to the divine. 
22 Chandogya Upanishad: 8.7; Taittiriya 
UpanishadII: 1.1. The texts are from 
Radhakrishnan's translation of the Principal 
Upanishads (Indus: New Delhi, 1994) [first 
published (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1953]. Pp. 458 and 541 respectively. 
23 WGB, 155. The Face of Truth, pp. 38-9 . 
24 The Visistadvaitins attributed to Brahman 
itself the qualities of being (satya), knowledge 
Unanal5liSqananda Onfrnity (anantatva) and 
purity (ama1atva). [WGB, p. 146]. 
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